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Respondent/Cross-Appellant
16th

of

August,

1988.

submitted his brief on the

Thereafter,

he

became

aware

of a

decision of the Utah Supreme Court, Mortensen v. Mortensen, 89
Utah Adv.
decision

Reports
is,

7, published

on August

respondent/cross-appellant

16,

1988.

believes,

That
highly

significant in regard to the issues presented to this court
and, accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(j) of

the

Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, this

authority is

submitted to this court as supplemental authority dealing with
Point III of respondent/cross-appellant' s brief as set forth
on pages 19 through 21.
In

its

pertinent

point,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

in

Mortensen v. Mortensen ruled that inherited property should
be awarded to the spouse inheriting it during the course of
the marriage, together with any appreciation or enhancement of
its value, 8 9 Utah Adv. Reports at 9.

However, the Court went

on to declare
. . . [U]nless (1) the other spouse has
by his or her efforts or expense
contributed
to t h e
enhancement,
maintenance or protection of that
property, thereby acquiring an equitable
interest in it.
DuBois v. DuBois, supra, . . . .
It is the position of Respondent/Cross-Appellant that this is
the exception that applied to the instant matter and the trial
court erred in not finding that the efforts
Appellant

in

managing

the

inherited

of the Cross -

property

produced

a

substantial enhancement of that property in which he does have
an equitable interest and which shoulp. have been awarded to
him by the trial court.
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This is an appeal from the property distribution set forth in
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce
entered on December 21, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(g)(1987) and
Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
ISS9SS gfiggSflTEP ON APP^Ii
1.

May a trial court postpone dividing a pension fund and

permit one spouse to use the income from the pension for support
when:

(a) an immediate division of the pension would leave one

spouse without sufficient income to provide support for himself or
his children; and (b) the other spouse has sufficient income and
financial resources to justify postponing division of the pension?
2.

May a trial court order a custodial parent to execute

documents necessary to permit the non-custodial parent to claim one
or more of the parties' children as a tax exemption?
3*

Did

the

trial

court

err

in

finding

that

both the

plaintiff s inheritance and the appreciation on that inheritance
were non-divisible, separate property although the appreciation was
a result of the defendant' s services?
4.

Should either party be awarded costs and attorneys' fees

incurred as a result of this appeal?
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i PROVISION,
26 U. S. C.

(e)

STftTTOgS. RTOPS M P jqSgTOVTIQffS

§152(e) (1988):

Support Test in Case of Child of Divorced Parents, etc.
(1) Custodial parent gets exemption. --Except
otherwise provided in this subsection, if-(A) a child (as defined in section
receives over half of his support
calendar year from his parents--

as

151(c)(3))
during the

(i)
who are divorced or legally separated
under a decree of divorce or separate
maintenance.
(ii)
who are separated
separation agreement, or

under

a written

(iii) who live apart at all times during the
last 6 months of the calendar year, and
(B) such child is in the custody of one or both of
his parents for more than one-half of the calendar
year
such child shall be treated, for purposes of subsection (a),
as receiving over half of his support during the calendar year
(hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the "custodial
parent" ).
(2) Exception where custodial parent releases claim to
exemptions for the year. — A child of parents described in
paragraph (1) shall be treated as having received over
half of his support during a calendar year from the noncustodial parent if-(A) the custodial parent signs a written
declaration
(in such manner and form as the
Secretary may by regulations prescribe) that such
custodial parent will not claim such child as a
dependent for any taxable year beginning in such
calendar year, and
(B) the non-custodial parent attaches such written
declaration to the noncustodial parent' s return of
the taxable year beginning during such calendar
year.

For purposes of this subsection, the term "noncustodial
parent" means the parent who is not the custodial parent.
(3)

Exception for multiple-support agreement- . . .

(4)

Exception for certain pre-1985 instruments. . . .

(5) Special rule for support received from new spouse of
parent. . . .

STATEMENT OF THE CAS^g
Th£
Complaint

instant

case

for Divorce,

was

initiated

which was

by

plaintiff s Verified

filed in the Third

Judicial

District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah on April 23,
1986.

Defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim for Divorce on

March 19, 1987.

The case was tried on July 30, 1987 before the

Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Third District Court Judge.
appeared in person and through counsel.

Defendant

Plaintiff appeared pro-se,

as her counsel had withdrawn shortly before trial (R. 151; R. 239,
Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 3).
At the time of trial, the parties stipulated to division of
the

majority

of

household

goods

and personal

property.

In

addition, the parties agreed to allege irreconcilable differences
as the grounds for divorce and defendant agreed that custody of
the parties' minor children could remain with the plaintiff.
The principle issues that were contested at trial include:
1.

Division of the defendant' s military retirement;

2.

Division of the plaintiff s inheritance; and

3.

Award of child support and alimony.

-3-

The

parties

were

the

only

witnesses

called

at

trial.

Testimony relevant to the issues now on appeal established the
following facts:
The defendant joined the United States Army, as a private, on
June 21, 1960, and a year later obtained an appointment to the
United States Military Academy at West Point (R. 239, Tr. July 30,
1987, at p. 66). The defendant graduated from the military academy
in June of 1965 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in engineering
(R.

239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at pp. 50-51).

The parties were

married on February 11, 1967, (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p.
66).

In

1977, while

serving

in the military,

the defendant

obtained a Masters of Business Administration from the University
of Utah (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 50).
Defendant retired from the military in June of 1984 (R. 239,
Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 66).

Upon retirement, defendant began

receiving monthly payments from his military pension, which net him
approximately $1,149.00 per month (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p.
67), After leaving the military, he began working in the area of
financial planning (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 69). Due to
difficulties in establishing a clientele and generating a return on
investments, at the time of the divorce the defendant' s business
was operating at a net monthly loss of income (R. 239, Tr. July 30,
1987, at pp. 90-91). The defendant's income also includes a monthly
payment of $315.00 received pursuant to a contract for the sale of
the parties' home in El Paso, Texas and approximately $11. 83 per
month in interest and dividends (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p.
-4-

6).

Thus, the defendant's net monthly income at the time of the

divorce was approximately $1,475.83. The majority of that income is
the income from the pension and, as the defendant testified, he
needs that income to live (R. 239, Tr. July 27, 1987 at p. 72).
The

plaintiff

completed

her nursii^g education

and

began

working on her Master' s Degree during the parties' marriage (R.
239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 191).

At the time of trial, she was

taking non-credit courses and estimated, at that rate, it would
take her five or six years to finish the Master' s program (R. 2 39,
Tr.

July 30, 1987, at pp. 51-53).

She started working for the

University of Utah Medical Center in 1980.

She is now a nursing

supervisor at the University of Utah Medical Center, in charge of
approximately

650 employees and she testified that her Master' s

training would assist her in advancing in her career (R. 239, Tr.
July 30, 1987, at pp. 52-56).

The plaintiff had a gross monthly

income of $2,205.00 and a net income of approximately $1,745.00
(R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 6).
In December of 1985, the plaintiff inherited
$100,000.00
$60,000.00
(R.

(R.

239, Tr. July

30,

1987, at p.

approximately
38). She gave

to the defendant to invest for the parties' children

239, Tr.

July

30,

1987, at p.

38). In February of 1985,

plaintiff inherited approximately another $40,000.00 in cash (R.
239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 41), and the defendant invested an
additional

$20, 000. 00.

At the time of divorce, the $80, 000. 00

invested by the defendant had increased to $112,384.00; a gain of
$32,384.00 (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987 at p. 39 and 49).
-5-

The parties

separated

in April

of

1986.

At the time of

trial, plaintiff was 44 years of age and defendant was 45 (R. 2 3 9,
Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 5).
After hearing the parties' testimony, the trial court:
1.

Ordered the defendant to pay child support of $175.00 per

month for each of the parties' three minor children for a total of
$52 5, 00 (Findings and Conclusions at p. 6, para. 5; Decree at p.
6, para. 5).
2.

Awarded each party $1.00 per year as alimony (Findings

and Conclusions at p. 7, paraQ 9; Decree at page 3, para. 9).
3.

Ruled that both the $140,000.00 inherited by plaintiff

and the $32,384.00 generated from the defendant' s investment of the
inheritance were not assets of the marital estate. Therefore the
funds

were

not

divided

between

the

parties

(Findings

and

Conclusions at p. 12 and 15, paras. 26 and 37; Decree at pp. 3 and
10-11, paras. 26 and 37).
4.
both

Ruled that division of the retirement benefits accrued by

plaintiff

support

and

defendant

is

postponed

obligation is satisfied—after

until

the parties'

defendant's
last

child

reaches the age of majority or graduates from high school (Findings
and Conclusions at page 14, para 35; Decree at p. 10, para. 35).

^The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in this
case are pages 190-205 of the record on appeal.
For the court' s
convenience, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are
attached to this brief as Exhibit "A" and are cited herein as
"Findings and Conclusions."
The Decree of Divorce, record pages
206-219, is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and cited as "Decree."
-6-

5.

Ruled that defendant should be permitted to take a tax

exemption for the parties' youngest child and, therefore, ordered
the plaintiff to execute the documents necessary to permit the
defendant

to claim that exemption

(Findings

and Conclusions at

page 7, para. 6; Decree at p. 2, para 6).

POINT I
The trial court has broad discretion in fashioning division of
a pension plan to facilitate an equitable division of property
under the circumstances presented in each divorce proceeding.
the

instant

case,

the

income

from

tlje defendant' s

constitutes the majority of the defendant's income.

In

pension

Without that

income, the defendant will be unable to support himself or his
children while he tries to establish a new career.
hand,

the plaintiff s income and other financial

sufficient

to permit

her to support

without the pension income.

herself

On the other
resources are

and her children

Consequently the trial court did not

err in postponing division of the pension until his child support
obligation terminates and allowing the defendant to use the pension
income until that time.
POINT II
As a general rule, the custodial parent is entitled to claim
his or her children as tax exemptions unless a statutory exception
to

that

rule

exemptions.

allows

the

non-custodial

26 U. S.C. §152(e).

parent

to

claim

the

One of the statutory exceptions

provides that a non-custodial parent may claim the exemptions if
-7-

the custodial parent executes a written waiver of the exemptions.
2 6 U. S. C.

§152(e)(2).

Allowing

a state

court

to

order

the

custodial parent to execute such a waiver does not impair the goal
behind the general rule, which is to relieve the Internal Revenue
Service of the burden of having to resolve factual disputes between
divorced parents to determine which is entitled to the exemptions.
Further, if the state court makes its order conditional upon the
non-custodial parent remaining current in child support, the order
can further the interest of the state and the custodial parent in
enforcing

support

permitted

to

obligations.

order

Thus, a state court

a custodial

parent

to

execute

should be
the waiver

necessary to allow the non-custodial parent to claim a child as a
tax exemption.
POINT III
The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to
consider one spouse' s inheritance and the appreciation in that
inheritance as property to be divided upon divorce when the other
spouse did nothing to contribute to the appreciation.

However, a

spouse should not be discouraged from rendering services that will
protect and enhance the other' s inheritance by being denied any
interest in the appreciation of the inheritance attributable to
such services.
the

Thus, the trial court erred in refusing to consider

appreciation

in

the

plaintiff s

attributable to the defendant' s services.

-8-

inheritance

that

is

POINT IV
Fees and costs on appeal should be granted under Utah Code
Ann.

§30-3-3(1984), when financial need of a party so dictates.

In this case, the plaintiff is in a much better financial condition
than defendant.

Thus, plaintiff is not entitled to an award of

attorneys' fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
TBS TOA& CQPRT DXP EOT frBiyss ITS DJSCiumOff
9Y ?QgT?QflXW? PI VISION QF Tffg PSFSSWANT g PgNglQN
UNTIL THE DEFENDANT' S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION
IS TEWffNfrTi;pf
Plaintiff devotes much of her argument on the retirement fund
issue to establishing that, under Utah law, the fund is property
that

must

be considered

constitutes

an

equitable

by a trial
division

court in determining what
of property.

See

Brief of

Appellant at pp. 12-13. That argument is unnecessary for purposes
of this appeal as that trial court ruled tjiat the pension fund is
an asset that should be divided between the parties
215).

(R. 203; R.

The defendant does not dispute that ruling and, in fact,

conceded at trial that he was willing to give up his interest in
the parties' house and to claim no interest in the funds inherited
by the plaintiff during the marriage in return for

being awarded

his pension fund, because he needed the income from the pension to
live and to provide support for his children (See R. 23 9, Tr. July
-9-

27,

1987 at pp. 31-32 and 71-72).

Thus, although the defendant

asked that the pension be awarded to him as an income stream and
not divided as an asset, the defendant acknowledged that the court
should consider the pension in determining an equitable property
division.
The real issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred
in postponing division of the pension fund until termination of the
defendant' s child support obligation. The plaintiff argues that,
because the defendant' s interest in the pension was vested at the
time of divorce and he was receiving monthly pension payments, the
trial court was required, under Woodward v» Woodward,
(Utah 1982) and

Marchant

v.

Marchant,

656 P. 2d 431

743 P. 2d 199 (Utah Ct. App.

1987), to award the plaintiff one-half of 7/8ths of each monthly
pension payment (approximately $645. 00 gross or $503.00 net) from
and after the time of the divorce. Brief of Appellant at pp. 14-15,
Neither Woodward or Marchant,
the subject found in Maxwell
Ct. App. May 6, 1988),
1988) and Bailey

v.

nor the more recent pronouncements on
v. Maxwell,

Gardner

Bailey,

v.

82 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah

Gardner,

748 P. 2d 1076 (Utah

745 P. 2d 830 (Utah Ct. App.

1987) place

such a restriction on the trial court's discretion in dividing a
pension fund.
Under Utah law, there is no question that retirement benefits,
whether vested or not, "are a form of deferred compensation which a
court
Gardner,

should

at least

consider when dividing

marital

748 P. 2d at 1078, As noted above, the defendant

-10-

assets. '•

acknowledged at trial that the court could consider his pension in
determining how to divide the parties' assets.
In Gardner,

the Utah Supreme Court noted that a trial court

has at its disposal many different methods of dividing a pension
plan,

any one of which may be appropriate depending

circumstances of the case. 748 P. 2d at 1079.

upon the

For instance, the

Court approved use of the Woodward formula, where other assets are
inadequate to offset the value of the pension or the present value
of the pension is impossible to calculate. Id.
P. 2d at

433.

The Court

also approved

citing

Woodward, 656

of a division method

requiring the spouse awarded the pension to make yearly installment
payments that compensate the other spouse for his or her equitable
share of the fund, Id.
(Utah Ct. App.

citing

Rayburn

v.

Rayburn,

748 P. 2d 238

1987), or awarding the entire pension to the retired

spouse and awarding property of equal value to the other spouse.
Id.

citing

Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P. 2d 1308 (Utah 1982).

In short, the

Woodward formula is not the only method of dividing a pension fund.
See Maxwell

82 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15.

The question remains: Did the trial court abuse its discretion
by postponing division of the pension fund and considering the
interim

pension

obligation?

income

in determining

the defendant' s support

The plaintiff argues that the court erred because the

award is tantamount to postponing the income from a bank account
and allowing one spouse to use the income therefrom for supportessentially
support

forcing the plaintiff to underwrite the defendant' s

obligation,

which,

the plaintiff
-11-

infers,

is obviously

impermissible.

Brief of Appellant at pp.

disputes that it is per

13-14.

The Defendant

se error to postpone division of property

to allow one spouse temporary use of that property.

It is not

uncommon for a court to award a home to one spouse although the
other spouse is entitled to a share of the equity in the house that
will not be satisfied until the home is sold.
v. Andersen,

See

e. g.

Andersen

85 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah Ct. App. June 22, 1988)

Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that one spouse
may be awarded a pension fund as a res
Dogu,

paid.

652

P. 2d

at

310.

from which alimony can be
There

is

no

reason

for

distinguishing this case and holding that a spouse may not be
temporarily awarded pension income from which he can pay child
support.
The only real constraint on the trial court' s discretion in
dividing a pension, especially in an unusual manner such as the
method of division used in the case at bar, is that the trial court
must set forth finding that justifies the method of division.
Bailey

v.

Bailey,

745 P. 2d at 833

See

(holding that, when it is

impossible to determine the present value of a pension, division
should be postponed until the spouse accumulating the pension is
entitled
reasons

to distribution thereof
for immediately

unless

the

court sets

forth

dividing the pension along with other

assets).
In

the

instant

case,

the

trial

court

found

that

the

defendant' s net monthly income apart from the pension payment, was
only

a net

of approximately

$200.00 per month
-12-

(Findings

and

Conclusions

at pp.

2-3, para.

7).

The court

found that the

plaintiff has a gross monthly income of $2,205.00 and awarded the
plaintiff her inheritance and the appreciation on that inheritance
(Findings

and Conclusions

at pp.

10-11, para.

37).

The court

ordered the defendant to pay a total of $525. 00 per month as child
support and noted that the amount was set taking into account the
pension

income

that

the defendant would

receive

(Findings and

Conclusions at pp. 6 and 11, paras. 5 and 35).
Those

findings

indicate

that,

if the pension

income is

immediately divided using the Woodward formula, the defendant will
have a monthly income of approximately $850.00 and the plaintiff
will take home approximately $2, 300. 00 per month, in addition to
the

income

that

she

can

earn

off

her

sizable

inheritance.

Certainly, under that scenario, the defendant would not be able to
provide any significant support for his children and may well be
entitled to receive alimony from plaintiff to prevent him from
becoming

a public

charge and allow him to live,

as nearly as

possible, in the manner that the parties enjoyed in their 17. 5
years of marriage, financially supporting the family.
would

That result

be less than equitable in view of the years of service

rendered by the defendant.

In short, the trial court postponed

division of the pension to permit the defendant to use the income

The plaintiff drilled the defendant on why a man with an
ML B. A. and a degree in engineering could not make more money after
retiring from the military. (R. 239, Tr. July 27, 1987 at p. 90. )
She did not suggest what he could do with his 20 year old West
Point degree or his 10 year old M. B.A. to earn more money outside
the military.
-13-

for a short time to begin a new career (something that he no doubt
anticipated doing when he decided to stay in the military long
enough to receive his pension), while still enabling him to provide
support for his children - not an unjust result.
If this Court determines that the trial court erred in not
dividing the pension using Woodward formula and, at the same time,
requires the defendant to meet the support obligation ordered by
the trial court, the defendant will be left with approximately
$300.00 per month upon which to live and the plaintiff will receive
over $2,700.00.

That result is obviously unfair.

plaintiff acknowledges, see

Thus, as the

Brief of Appellant at p. 16, if the

trial court orders immediate division of the pension income, this
case should be remanded to the trial court for modification of the
child support award and an award of alimony that will allow the
defendant to live, as nearly as possible, in the style that he
enjoyed prior to the divorce.
POINT II
A TRIAL COURT MAY ORDER A CUSTODIAL PARENT TO EXECUTE
DQQTjmmS WgCflggART FQR T*JSflQNCiygTQDIAI,PARENT TQ gLA^M
ONE OR MORE OF THE PARTIES' CHILDREN AS A TAX EXEMPTION.
Almost a year after the instant case was decided, this Court,
in Martinez

v. Martinez,

754 P. 2d 69 (1988), ruled that a post-1985

divorce decree did not constitute a "qualified pre-1985 instrument"
pursuant to which a non-custodial parent can claim a tax exemption
for his or her child under 26 0. S. C. §152(e)(4) (1988), although
the divorce decree modified a pre-1985 stipulation that allowed the
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non-custodial parent to take the exemptions. Id.

at 72. The Court

held that, because the non-custodial parent had not established
that he fell within any of the statutory exceptions to the general
rule that the custodial parent is also entitled to claim exemptions
for the parties' children, the trial court erred in awarding tax
exemptions to the non-custodial parent. Id.
The

existence

of

a "qualified

pre-1985

instrument"

that

allocates a tax exemption to the non-custodial parent is not the
only exception to the general rule that a custodial parent is
entitled to claim the parties' children as a tax exemption. A noncustodial parent is entitled to the exemption if: (1) the custodial
parent signs a written declaration that he or she will not claim
the

child

as

an exemption;

and

(2) the

non-custodial

parent

attaches that written declaration to his or her tax return.

26

U. S. C. §152(e)(2). In short/ a non-custodial parent can claim an
exemption if the custodian executes a written waiver of the right
to claim the child.
In interpreting
courts

and

have established

applying

the waiver

exception,

two lines of reasoning,

state

which lead to

opposite results. One line of reasoning simply finds that because a
federal

statute grants

the exemptions

to the custodial parent,

state courts cannot change that result by ordering the custodial
parent to execute a waiver of the exemption. Jensen

v. Jensen,

753

P. 2d 342, 345 (Nev. 1988)(holding that it is improper for a trial
court to order the custodial parent to execute a waiver when the
same economic

result

could be achieved
-15-

by decreasing

the non-

custodial

parent's

support

obligation);

Lorenz

v.

Lorenz,

419

N. W. 2d 770, 771 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a state court has
no jurisdiction
exemption

but

over which party
noting

that,

can claim

where

the

a child

level

of

as

a tax

support

was

determined in conjunction with allowing the non-custodial parent to
claim children as tax exemptions, it is appropriate for a trial
court to decrease the amount of support if the non-custodial parent
refuses to waive the exemptions).

Davis

v.

Fair,

707 S. W. 2d 711

(Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (again holding that where a non-custodial parent
is denied an exemption under 26 U. S. C. §152, it is appropriate to
decrease the amount of support paid by that parent).
The better view,

and the view adopted by the majority of

courts that have addressed the issue, is that, although a state
court

cannot

award

tax

exemptions

simply

by ordering

who is

entitled to the exemptions, the court may order a custodial parent
to execute the waiver necessary for a non-custodial parent to claim
the exemptions under 26 U. So C. §152(e)(2). Hughes
Ohio

165;

518 N, E. 2d

1213

(1988);

Wis. 2d 166, 420 N. W. 2d 414 (Ct. App.

Pergolski
1988);

S. E. 2d 449 (W. Va. 1987); Theroux v. Boehmler
Theroux),

v.

Hughes,

v. Pergolski,
Cross

35
143

v. Cross,

363

(In re the Marriage

410 N. W. 2d 354 (Minn, Ct. App. 1987); Lincoln

155 Ariz. 272, 746 P. 2d 13 (Ct. App. 1987); Fudenberg

v.
v.

of

Lincoln,
Moisted,

390 N. W. 2d 19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). The reasoning behind that view
is as follows:
Prior to 1984, 26 U. S. C. §152(e) stated that the parent who
provided the larger share of support to a child could claim the
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child as an exemption and the non-custodial parent was presumed

to

provide the larger share of support if he or she paid more than
$1,200.00 per year as child support. As a result of that rule, the
Internal Revenue Service was forced to resolve disputes between
parents over who actually provided more support for the child.

In

order to relieve the I. R. S. from the burden of resolving these
domestic disputes,
conclusively,

26 U. S. C. §152(e) was amended to establish,

that the custodial parent is entitled to claim a

child as an exemption,

unless one of the statutory exceptions is

present. See e.g.

Pergolskl,

420 N. W. 2d at 417; Cross,

at 449; Lincoln,

746 P. 2d at 16. Nowhere in the amended Section

363 S. W. 2d

152(e) is a state court prohibited from ordering a party to execute
the waiver necessary to allow a non-custodial parent to claim a
child as an exemption under the exception provided in §152(e)(2).
Allowing the state court to issue such an order does not impede the
goal of the statute - the I. R. S. is still not required to resolve
disputes about who is entitled to the exemption. See e. g.
363 So E. 2d at 458-59.

Cross,

Further, such an order may promote the

interest of the custodial parent.

The state court can order the

custodial parent to execute a waiver, only if the non-custodial
parent remains current in his or her support obligations, which
gives the custodial parent some leverage to assist in collecting
past-due child support when the defaulting parent desires to file a
tax

return.

See

e. g.

Cross,

at

459-60.

On

the

other

hand,

prohibiting a trial court from issuing such an order may prevent
the court

from promoting the parties' interest by awarding the
-17-

exemption to the party with the highest income - rendering more
disposable income available for support of the parties and their
children. Id
In

at 460.

short,

permitting

a state

court to order a custodial

parent to execute the waiver necessary to allow a non-custodial
parent to claim a child as an exemption does not conflict with
federal law and may promote the interest of the state and the
custodial

parent

Consequently,

in

enforcing

a trial

court

a

should

child

support

obligation.

be permitted

to

order a

custodial parent to execute the waiver required to allow the noncustodial parent to claim a child as a tax exemption.
In the instant case, the defendant was awarded an exemption
for one of the parties' children, so long as he is current in his
child support payments, and the plaintiff was ordered to execute
the documents
(Decree

at

authorities

p.

required by the I. R. S. to effectuate
2, para.

presented

Alternatively,

6).

above,

In accord
that

order

with

the

should

be

that award
points

and

affirmed.

if this Court finds that the trial court cannot

order the defendant to execute a waiver of the tax exemption, the
case should be remanded to permit an adjustment in child support to
reflect the loss of disposable income that the defendant will incur
by losing the tax exemption.
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POINT I I I

Tflg APPRECIATION IN MCOTSY INHERITED 3Y QNg ggQggg DgfiJNg A MAfiRlAgg
SBQVIiP BE CONSIDERED IN PSTERfflNINC AN EOmTABftE DIVISION
OF PROPERTY IN A DIVORCE PROCEEDING WHEN THE

APPRECIATION is ppg TO THE SERVICE RENDERED BY T H E Q ^ E R $PQOgEy
In the instant case, the uncontroverted evidence indicates
that

during

$80,000.00
invested

the

marriage,

the

plaintiff

gave

of the $140,000.00 she inherited
that

$32,384.00
Consistent

(R.

money

and

239; Tr.

with that

generated
July 27,

evidence,

defendant

and the defendant

a return

of

1987 at pp.

the trial

the

court

approximately

48-49 and 69).
ruled that the

$32,384.00 was attributable, in part, to the defendant' s services.
Yet the trial court ruled that the $32, 384. 00 was not a marital
asset that was subject to division between the parties (Findings
and Conclusions at p. 5, 12 and 15, paras. 14, 26 and 37).
The general rule of law governing division of one spouse7 s
inheritance in a divorce proceeding is that it

"may be viewed as

separate property, and in appropriate circumstances, equity will
require that each party retain the separate property. . . . However
the rule is not invariable." Burke
(Utah 1987).

v. Burke,

733 P. 2d 133, 135

In determining whether it is appropriate to divide an

inheritance in a divorce proceeding, a trial court must consider a
number of factors including the factors that must be considered
when dividing any property, marital or otherwise, such as: the type
of property involved, the length of the marriage; and the parties7
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respective financial position. Id.

A trial court may award one

spouse his or her entire inheritance and the appreciation thereto
if the award is equitable, especially if the other spouse has not
contributed to the appreciation in the property. Id.
also

Newmeyer v. Newmeyer,

a trial

at 136; see

745 P. 2d 1276 (Utah 1987) (holding that

court properly awarded one spouse the amount

that she

invested into the parties' home from her inheritance, in view of
the fact that the appreciation in the house was divided equally
between the parties).
However,

"of

particular

concern"

in

a case

in which

an

inheritance and associated appreciation is at issue is "whether one
spouse has made any contribution toward the growth" of the other
Burke,

spouse' s inherited property.

733 P. 2d at 135. Thus, where

the parties' property consists primarily of gifts obtained from one
spouse' s parents and the appreciation on those gifts earned through
investments made by the other spouse, it is appropriate to consider
the appreciation as marital property that should be divided between
the parties. See Dubois

v.

Dubois,

29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P, 2d 1380,

1381 (1973).
In the

instant

case,

the

circumstances

dictate

that,

at

minimum, the appreciation on the plaintiff s inheritance that is
attributable

have

been

considered as property to be divided between the parties.

The

facts

in

to

this

the

case

defendant' s investments

indicate

that

the

should

plaintiff

has

only a

Volkswagen Jetta to show for the $60, 000o 00 that she inherited but
did not give the plaintiff to invest* She could not account for the
-20-

remainder

of

the

funds.

Yet,

the

$80,000.00

invested

by the

defendant earned a return of almost 50% leaving the plaintiff with
over $110,000.00 at the time of the divorce. Certainly, a spouse
should not be discouraged from protecting and enhancing property
that

the

other

spouse

receives

through

gifts,

inheritance or

otherwise by being denied the benefit of his or her services if the
marriage ends in divorce.
The impracticality and inequity that would result if, as a
general rule, a spouse is not entitled to share in appreciation of
the other spouse' s property when the appreciation is attributable
to his or her services, is compounded in the instant case. In this
case, the plaintiff s inheritance came towards the end of a long
I
marriage,

after

the

most

valuable

separate

property

of the

defendant, his West Point degree, had largely been expended and had
allowed the parties' to acquire an estate worth nearly $200, 000. 00.
As a result of the late inheritance,

the plaintiff leaves the

marriage with very good financial resources, while the defendant' s
resources are only moderate—at a time when he is trying to start a
new career.
Under these circumstances, the trial court erred in refusing
to consider the appreciation in the plaintiff s inheritance as an
asset which should be considered in dividing property between the
parties.
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POINT IV
THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF

ATTORNEYS' FgSg FOR TfflCS A??gAft,
The plaintiff correctly argues that Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3
(1984) authorizes a court to award attorney's fees in a divorce
action and that this may include attorney' s fees for an appeal.
However, as this Court has ruled, an award of attorney' s fees under
Utah

Code

financial

Ann.

§30-3-3

must

be

"based

on

evidence

need of the party and the reasonableness

awarded* " Andersen

v. Andersen,

85 Utah Adv., Rep.

of both

of the fee

at 19. As noted

above, the plaintiff leaves the parties' marriage in a much better
financial position than does the defendant.

She has both a higher

monthly income than the defendant and, thanks to her inheritance, a
much greater financial reserve. Under these circumstances, if there
is

to be

an award

of attorney' s fees,

it should

be to the

defendant.
Plaintiff

erroneously

argues

that

she

is

entitled

to

attorney' s fees because the defendant urged the trial court to
award him his retirement as an "income stream".
Point I infra

As indicated in

the defendant conceded that the pension should be

considered in a division of the parties' property and in fact
offered to give up his interest in the parties'
appreciation in the plaintiff s

home and the

inheritance if he was awarded the

pension as an income stream because he needed the income to live.
The trial court ruled that the pension was indeed an asset subject
-22-

to division between the parties but postponed division of the fund
to allow the defendant to use the income to support himself and his
children - an equitable determination that fell somewhere between
what the defendant and the plaintiff had requested.
The plaintiff s argument that there is some reason to award
attorney's
simply

fees

on the basis

incomprehensible.

of the defendant's

Attorney' s

fees

where one party appeals in good faith. See
the
this

Marriage

of

Milanovich,

case,

the

defendant

division

of

the

should
e. g.

697 P. 2d 927, 928
decided

appreciation

to

in the

ask

cross-appeal

the

not
In

be

the

(Mont,
Court

inheritance

plaintiff had already appealed the case to this court.

awarded

Matter

of

1985),

In

to

only

is

rule

on

after the
The law in

Utah is unclear on division of appreciation in the property of one
spouse that is attributable to the services of the other spouse.
Moreover,

the

law

that

exists

indicates

that

such

appreciation

should be considered as property to be divided between the parties.
Consequently,

the plaintiff s request

for fees and costs on

appeal should be denied.

CQNCLPSICW
Based

upon

the

foregoing

points

and

authorities,

the

defendant respectfully requests that this court:
(1)
of

the

Affirm the trial court's ruling, which postpones division
defendant's

pension

until

his

child

support

obligation

terminates; and
(2)
exemption

Affirm the trial court's order awarding defendant a tax
for

one

of

the

parties'
-23-

children

and

requiring

the

plaintiff to execute the documents necessary to effectuate that
order; or,
If this court reverses the trial court's ruling on either the
pension or the tax exemption, defendant requests that this case be
remanded to the trial court for a modification of support and
alimony that will leave the defendant with sufficient income to
support himself.
In addition, the defendant requests that this court reverse
the

trial

court's

determination

that

the

appreciation

in

plaintiff s inheritance is not property that should be divided
between the parties and remand the case to the trial court for an
equitable division of the appreciation.
Finally, the defendant requests that plaintiff s request for
fees and costs on appeal be denied.

DATED this 16th day of August, 1988.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL

D
DAVID S.H I IDOLOWITZ
JULIE A. BRYAN
Attorneys for Respondent/Cross
Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of August, 1988, I
caused to be mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing,
postage prepaid, to:
KENT M. KASTING
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
310 South Main
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

(td/jab/mot«j.brl)
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PILED IN CLERKS O ^ i C E
Salt Lake CounW ' i*ah

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF

UTAH

* * * * * * * *

BARBARA MOTES,
Plaintiff,

)
)

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

vs.
PRESTON MOTES,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No.

D86-1615

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

* * * * * * * *

The above-entitled matter came before the court for
trial on Thursday, the 30th day of July, 1987, the Honorable
Kenneth Rigtrup presiding.
representing herself.

The plaintiff was present in person,

The defendant was present in person and

represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz.

The court discussed

the issues with the parties to see what could be resolved by
agreement, then heard and considered the testimony of the parties, examined the exhibits offered by the parties, and, being
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following as
its

^HIBITA

uooiso

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The

parties

were

both

residents

of

Salt

Lake

County, State of Utah, on the date this action was filed and each
had been so for more than three months immediately prior thereto.
2.

The parties are husband and wife, having been mar-

ried February 11, 1967, in Ardmore, Pennsylvania*
3.

There have been four children born as issue of

this marriage, three of whom, Kimberly, age 16, born October 19,
1970; Tamara, age 14, born October 5, 1972; and Charissa, age 13,
born December 27, 1973, are minors.
4.

The parties agreed that care, custody and control

of the minor children of the parties should be awarded to the
plaintiff,

subject

to

liberal

rights

of

visitation

by

the

defendant.
5.

The plaintiff is 44 years of age, is presently

employed as a nursing supervisor, where she supervises more than
650 employees at the University of Utah Hospital and earns a
gross income of $2,205.00 per month.
6.

The plaintiff acquired her nursing education dur-

ing the course of the marriage.
7.

The defendant is 45 years of age, a graduate of

the United States Military Academy at West Point and has an
M.B.A. earned from the University of Utah acquired during the
marriage.

He is presently retired from the United States Mili-

tary and receives $1,484.00

a month as retirement
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pay.

In

addition, he receives $315.00 a month as payment on a note for
the sale of property owned by the parties in El Pasof Texas, and
has earned, on an average basis, commissions from his employer,
Waddell & Reed, as a financial planner, $248.00 a month.

He has

incurred expenses in conducting his business at Waddell & Reed of cuitfu^u

A
$330,00 a month.
8.
When

In February,

the parties went

found

and

father

died.

to the home that he had occupied,

removed

from

father

made

plaintiff's

1985, the plaintiff's

the

home

plaintiff

$30,000.00
his

sole

in

heir

cash.
and

she

they
The
has

inherited the said $30,000.00 in cash at the time of her father's
death,

$100,000.00

1986;

and

$140,500.00.

in

$3,000.00

December,
in

1985;

December,

$7,500.00

1986,

for

in

November,

a

total

of

The estate has not been finally distributed, but

most of it has been disbursed.
9.

After the parties removed the $30,000.00 from the

plaintiff's father's home, $20,000.00 was given to the defendant
by the plaintiff to invest for their children and accounts were
opened up in the sum of $5,000.00 for each of the four children
*of

the

parties.

After

the

$100,000.00

payment

had

been

received, an additional $10,000.00 was set aside for each of the
children of the parties.

There are, now, $15,000.00 plus earn-

ings in the accounts of each of the children of the parties for a
total of $60,000 plus earnings.
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00011*2

10•

The parties acquired a home and real property at

1516 South Wasatch Drivef Salt Lake, City, Utah, in which they
have accumulated an equity of^flOOj423i00; a note from the sale of
property in El Paso, Texas, valued at $35,000*00; IRA accounts,
in

the

United

Funds,

$17,350.00;

Continental,

$8,000.00;

Magelland Fund, $19,083.00; stock accounts in the Fidelity Destiny Fund, $41,263.00; shares of stock in AT&T and the other Bell
companies plus accumulated reinvested dividends presently valued
at $3,800.00; an account at Wilson-Davis for various penny stocks
valued at $50.00; a 1980 Oldsmobile, valued at^flQO lOO; a 1982
Volvo automobile, valued" at/ ^ ^ m ^ g w ; a 1986 Jetta automobile,
valued at^$7,000.00j/ a fund for payment of taxes in the Vanguard
Fund of $1,149.00; and an Army Mutual Aid Insurance Policy with a
present cash value of $3,100.00.
11.

The plaintiff has a retirement account through her

employment at the University of Utah Hospital with a proo<mt
vjjiXuQ ef $5,129.00; her own checking account at the Credit Union
for the balance of $7,6 80.00, and a Pentagon Credit Union Account
with a balance of $3,721.00.
12.
Defense

Center

The defendant has a savings account at the Air
Credit

Union

of

$375.00; a

checking

account

through the Air Defense Center Credit Union of $1,0 00.00; a Pentagon Credit Union Account of $275.00; and checking account at
First Security Bank of $500.00.
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-tea,

13.

The parties have fought for a substantial period

of time and have demonstrated that there are irreconcilable differences between them

in terms of their goals, values and how

they treat each other, which make continuation of their marriage
relationship impossible.
14.
inherited

The

by

earnings ^

the plaintiff

pendency of

a portion

and J M * investments

of

the

have

money

produced

Both of the parties disposed of assets during the
this matter.

16.
well as being
she

invested

$32,384.00.
15.

which

defendant

The plaintiff is presently enrolled in school, as
employed

believes

will

and hopes
be

to obtain

necessary

to

a Master's

further

her

Degree
nursing

career.
17.

The court discussed with the parties division of

their personal property from a list prepared by the defendant and
they agreed to divide the personal items between them as is hereinafter set out.
18.

^

u*.

. ^

The plaintiff desires that her/name be ohdngod to

Barbara Van Asdlan.
19.

Each of the parties employed counsel to represent

them in this matter. Counsel for the plaintiff withdrew shortly
before the trial and the plaintiff chose to represent herself,
rather than employ new counsel.
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From

the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now

makes and enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Each of the parties should be awarded a Decree of

Divorce from the other, said Decrees to become final upon entry*
2.

Care, custody and control of the minor children of

the parties should be awarded to the plaintiff, subject to liberal rights of visitation by the defendant.
3.

The defendant and the children are to work out

their own visitation arrangements upon 24-hour advance notice
with which the plaintiff should not interfere*
4.

Each of the parties should be enjoined and prohib-

ited from dgmitfoiJjHj the other to the children or taking any
action to involve the children in their disputes.

Each should be

supportive of the other as the parent of the children.
5.

The defendant should be ordered to pay the sum of

$175.00 per child per month as child support for each of the
children until that child attains the age of 18 and/or graduates
from high school with his or her age-appropriate class.

The

defendant should be enioined from placing any initials or comments on the checks.^ One-half of the child support should be
paid on or before the 5th of each month and one-half should be
paid on or before the 20th of each month.

This order regarding

child support should become effective August 1, 1987.
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6.

The defendant should be awarded the youngest child
Ktf«

TP^JI^A

&** CHAtoiJr^

,0

~ifetf*«fr*+iX&$.VIA*CM* ,****•

of the parties, Charissa, as his tax dependentJand the plaintiff^ ^

^

should be ordered to sign all documents required by the Internal "** (p*^
Revenue Service to effect this award,
7.
entry of

All

child

support

the Decree of Divorce

payments

from

and

after

the

in this matter should be made

through the clerk of the Salt Lake County Court.
8.

A withhold and deliver order should be authorized

to be executed should the defendant fall more than 30 days behind
in the payment of his child support.
9.

Each of the parties is awarded $1.00 per year as

alimony from the other•
10.

Each of the parties should be ordered to retain

their existing life insurance policies for the minor children of
the

parties

until

child

support

for

the

youngest

child

terminates.
11.

Each

party

should

be

ordered

to

maintain

such

health, accident, dental, orthodontic and hospital insurance as
they have available to them through their employment for the benefit of the minor children of the parties for so long as they may
provide such insurance protection under the terms and conditions
of the applicable insurance policies and each, should be ordered
to pay one-half

of any uninsured medical,/ dental, hospital or

orthodontic expenses.

-7-

fit12,

The plaintiff should have her name ^shqfcugp&cb. to the

name of Van Asdlan.
13*

Each of the parties should be ordered to sign all

documents and take all actions necessary to effect the provisions
of the Decree of Divorce.
14.

The agreement of the parties regarding division of

their personal property should be accepted by the court and,
accordingly, the defendant is awarded, and the plaintiff should
be ordered to deliver to the defendant, the following items:
a.
The bedroom set located in the master bedroom, including the king-sized bed, chest, dresser, mirrors and
nightstands;
b.

One of the large down comforters;

c.

His West Point blanket;

d.

The

e.

The sofa and loveseat located in the family

two

table

lamps

with

the

tripod-type

base;
room;
f.
The glass-topped
used as an endtable for the sofa;
g.

The

clay

table

table
lamp

in the family room
on

the

glass-topped

table;
h.
The large Sand painting given as a birthday
present to the defendant;
i.

The Frace eagle over the fireplace;

j.

The Ray Harm eagle print;

k.

The silver West Point plate;

1.

The two pen and ink drawings of Landstuhl;
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ra.

The West Point print;

n.

The "Old Man" painting;

p.

Six of the etchings;

q.

The Merimbege River painting;

r.

Two of the Hughes paintings;

s.

Two large Sansui speakers;

t.

Two channel tape drive;

u.

Two Kenwood speakers;

v*

Pioneer tuner;

w.

Phonograph turntable;

x.

AKAI tapedeck (two channel);

y.

Two of the three wall clocks;

2.

Apple computer, printer and software;

aa*

The flower set of Franciscan china;

bb«

The Sango china;

cc«

The set of Nachmann whisky beakers;

dd.

The Rosenthal crystal;

ee,

Copper pots and pans;

ff.

Pewterware; plates, cups, goblets, pitcher,

gg.

Table linens to include one of the Army-Navy

hh.

Desk in the laundry room;

iie

The old green table from "Pops;"

steins;
tableclothes;

jj.
One cardtable with one round piece of glass
and one rectangular piece;
kk.

The Flokoti rugs and brass samovar;
-9-
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11.
The National Geographic books and magazines
and the bookcase in the study;
mm.

Handtools and power tools;

nn.

The aquarium;

oo.
All of
items, including uniforms;

Defendant's

personal

clothing

and

pp.
All items purchased by Defendant before marriage to include textbooks and records;
qq.

Remainder of the flatware set;

rr.

Balance of Defendant's business records.

ss.

Large china hutch obtained from P. D. 0. in

Germany;
15.

The plaintiff should be specifically awarded
a.

The Gieol painting;

b.

Two Bassett paintings;

c«

The four-channel tape drive;

d.

Two bookcase speakers (Pioneer);

e.

SANSUI tuner;

fo

Grundig console and six speakers;

g.

AKAI tape deck (larger);

h.

Cassette deck;

i.

One of the three wall clocks;

j.

Pewter candlesticks;

k.

French hutch;

1.

Twelve Hummel figurines;

m.

ia hhouse
n,,c
One set of tools for use around the
^

&i%} #
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16.

The defendant should be ordered to make available

to the plaintiff any records that the plaintiff shall request so
that they can be reproduced on a c a s s e t t ^ ^ / r f ^ ^ ^
^^

'

personal^

17,

Each of the parties should be awarded all items of

property

in

his/her

possession

not

hereinabove

specified*
18.

The defendant should be ordered to make available

to the plaintiff any pictures, photographs or slides which she
wishes duplicated and those will be duplicated at her expense.
19.
accounts

of

plaintiff's
those

The
the

plaintiff
children

should

be

established

awarded
with

all

funds

inheritance and the right and obligation

accounts,

and

the defendant

should

be

ordered

of

the

from

the

to manage
to

take

appropriate steps to turn those over to the plaintiff.
20.

All

right,

title

and

interest

in

the

home

on

Wasatch Drive should be awarded to the plaintiff, free of any
interest of the defendant, subject to her payment of the first
mortgage and payment of the debt and obligation of approximately
$4,000.00

due

to

the

Pentagon

Credit

$3,500.00 to the Norwest Credit Union.

Union

and

approximately

The plaintiff should be

responsible for these obligations from and after August 1, 1987,
and should be ordered to hold the defendant harmless therefrom.
21.

The Trinidad note should be awarded to the defen-

dant, free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff.
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22.

Each of the parties should be awarded one of the

Horizon lots which have no present value.
23.

The defendant should be awarded the interest of

the parties in the United funds IRA Account; the Fidelity Destiny
Fund; the Wilson-Davis Account; the Army Mutual Aid Insurance
Policy; the- Air Defense Center Savings account; the Air Defense
Center checking account; his Pentagon Credit Union account; and
Defendant's First Security checking account.
24.
IRA account;

The plaintiff should be awarded the Continental
the Magellan

fund;

the

family AT&T stock; her

accounts at the University of Utah Credit Union; and Plaintifffs
Pentagon Credit Union account.
25.

The

defendant

should

be

awarded

the

1980

Oldsmobile and the plaintiff should be awarded the 1982 Volvo and
the 1986 Jetta. *
26.

Thef$32,384.00 earned bytohoidefendantthrough hicr

N ^ ' 6TKV

Tnar^ps3!re?rt—o£l the property inherited by the plaintiff should be
considered a non-asset of the marriage.
27.

The defendant shall obtain from Sears a statement

of the account balance due as of May lf 1986.
with having paid $140.00 on that account.

He is credited

Each of the parties

shall be obligated to pay one-half of that account balance.

If,

after deduction of the $140.00 paid by the defendant, there is
any money due below $140.00, that should be paid by the plaintiff.

If the amount due, after credit of the $140.00 is more
-12vJf \_; VJ A * \j* -

than $140.00, the defendant should pay that sum to the plaintiff
or judgment shall be entered
balance over $280.00.

in her favor for one-half of the

If the defendant, by paying $140.00 shall

have paid more than one-half of the amount that was due on May 1,
1986, the amount by which he has exceeded payment of one-half of
the balance due should be a credit against the child support he
shall have been ordered to pay.
28.

If there are orthodontic bills due which have not

been paid by insurance, each of the parties should pay one-half
of

that

unpaid

balance

and

one-half

of

any

incurred for and on behalf of the children.

counseling

bills

If there is a bill

for counseling for the defendant, he should pay it himself.
29.

The defendant should be ordered to pay the obliga-

tions due to MasterCharge and First Security Bank and to hold the
plaintiff harmless therefrom.
30.

Each of the parties should assume, pay and hold

the other harmless from any debts or obligations incurred since
their separation.
31.

Each of the parties should assume and pay their

own costs and fees as incurred in this matter.
32*
by

the

The request of the plaintiff that her fees be paid

defendant

should

be

denied,

as

she

has

substantial

resources of her own to pay her own fees.
33.

The defendant should be ordered to verify that all

of the checks he testified he has transmitted to the plaintiff

-13(J lj U
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shall have cleared the bank and been paid to her.

If he deter-

mines that they have not cleared the bank, then, he should be
ordered

to

put

stop

orders

against

those

checks

and

write

replacement checks.
34.

Each of the parties should be enjoined and prohib-

ited from physically abusing, harassing, bothering, or attempting
to intimidate the other

in any way, wherever they may be or

reside.
35.

The court, recognizing that the plaintiff claims

that the military retirement pay of the defendant is an asset
which should be divided which is disputed by the defendant who
contends that the fund is an income stream, not an asset because
it is being paid to him, and that the court has determined that
the defendant receives $1,484.00 as retirement pay (upon which

tne

court has set the child support obligation of the defendant in
light of that obligation as well as the fact that the plaintiff
has accrued a retirement account through the State of Utah which
has a present value of $5,129.00 rules final disposition as to an
award regarding either of the retirement accounts of the parties
should be reserved until the obligation to pay child support
terminates.
36.

The court declares that it believes that it has

divided the property of the parties with/$87,707.00 being awarded
to the plaintiff and/$99,913.00 being awarded to the defendant^
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and the extra amount has been awarded to the defendant for financial services provided to the plaintiff and the marital estate,
37.

The court has determined that it should award to

the plaintiff the funds that she has inherited without counting
that as #part of the marital estate, although the defendant has
requested that this be included for consideration purposes and
that part of it, that is, the money that has been earned from the
inheritance^through the management of the defendant be considered
as a marital asset.
DATED this

94 "~~ day of

ftyJ^Wv

, 1937.

KfeNNETH RIGTRUI
District Court Judge
d

-

\

•

«

*

.

»

-

'

«

•

H. DIXON H1NOLEY
CLERK '

/}

By

-15-

000204

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following on this

/ft day of

September, 1987:
Ms. Barbara Van Asdlan
1516 South Wasatch Drive
Salt Lake Cityy_Utah

j^\~~iyj^^c^/
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ

^J

DSD:080487K
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FiLED IN CLERK'S OFP'CE
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

S a l t L a * ^ ('".-.i•<-!+< > *tah

DEC 211987
H Dixon Hmdiev^ierk

3rd\pisi/youri

Y

Deputy Cierj

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

^ k SL\3 HO bSTl

BARBARA J. MOTES,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. D86-1615
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

PRESTON J. MOTES,
Defendant.

* * * * * * * *

The above-entitled matter came before the court for
trial on Thursday, the 30th day of July, 1987, the Honorable
Kenneth Rigtrup presiding.

The plaintiff was present in person

and representing herself.

The defendant was present in person

and represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz.

The court dis-

cussed the issues with the parties to see what could be resolved
by agreement, then heard and considered the testimony of the parties, examined the exhibits offered by the parties, and, being
advised in the premises, and having made and entered its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:

EXHIBIT B

00i)2(;G

1.

Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of Divorce

from the other, said Decree to become final upon entry.
2.
the parties

Care, custody and control of the minor children of
is awarded to the plaintiff, subject

to liberal

rights of visitation by the defendant.
3.

The defendant

and the children shall work out

their own visitation arrangements upon 24-hour advance notice
with which the plaintiff shall not interfere.
4.

Each of the parties is enjoined and prohibited

from donjfcgatLrfg the other to the children or taking any action to
involve the children in their disputes.

Each shall be supportive

of the other as the parent of the children.
5.

The defendant is ordered to pay the sum of $175.00

per child per month as child support for each of the children
until that child attains the age of 18 and graduates from high
school with his or her age-appropriate class.

The defendant is

enjoined from placing any initials or comments on the checks.
One-half of tne child support shall be paid on or before the 5th
of each month and one-half shall be paid on or before the 20th of
each month.

This order regarding child support shall become

effective August 1, 1987.
6.

The defendant is awarded the youngest child of the

parties, Charissa, as his tax dependent,^and the plaintiff

o^t-<

is^^F^

ordered to sign all documents required by the Internal Revenue (f**^**}
Service to effect this award.
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7.
entry

of

All

child

the Decree

support

of Divorce

payments

from

and

in this matter

after

shall

the

be made

through the clerk of the Salt Lake County Court.
8.

A withhold and deliver order is authorized to be

executed^ should the defendant

fall more than 30 days behind in

the payment of his child support.
9.

Each of the parties is awarded $1.00 per year as

alimony from the other.
10.
existing

Each of

the parties

is ordered

to retain

their

life insurance policies for the minor children of the

parties until child support for the youngest child terminates.
11.

Each

party

is ordered

to maintain

such

health,

accident, dental, orthodontic and hospital insurance as they have
available to them through their employment for the benefit of the
minor children of the parties for so long as they may provide
such insurance protection under the terms and conditions of the
applicable insurance policies and each is ordered to pay one-half
of

any

uninsured

medical,/ dental,

expenses.

hospital

or

orthodontic

^
12.

The plaintiff should be Gh^ngod to the name of Van

13.

Each of the parties is ordered to sign all docu-

Asdlan.

ments and take all actions necessary to effect the provisions of
this Decree of Divorce.

14.

The agreement of the parties regarding division of

their personal property should be accepted by the court and,
accordingly, the defendant is awarded, and the plaintiff should
be ordered to deliver to the defendant, the following items:
a.
The bedroom set located in the master bedroom, including the king-sized bed, chest, dresser, mirrors and
nightstands;
b.

One of the large down comforters;

c«

His West Point blanket;

d.

The

e.

The sofa and loveseat located in the family

two

table

lamps with

the

tripod-type

base;
room;
f.
The glass-topped
used as an endtable for the sofa;
g.

The

clay

table

table
lamp

in the family room
on

the

glass-topped

table;
h.
The large Sand painting given as a birthday
present to the defendant;
i.

The Frace eagle over the fireplace;

j*

The Ray Harm eagle print;

k.

The silver West Point plate;

1.

The two pen and ink drawings of Landstuhl;

m.

The West Point print;

n.

The "Old Man" painting;

p.

Six of the etchings;

qe

The Merimbege River painting;

r.

Two of the Hughes paintings;

s.

Two large Sansui speakers;
-4-
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Two channel tape drives;

u«

Two Kenwood speakers;

v.

Sansui tuner;

w.

Phonograph turntable;

x.

La Caille tapedeck (two channel);

y.

Two of the three wall clocks;

z.

Apple computer, printer and software;

aa.

The flower set of Franciscan china;

bb.

The Sango china;

cc.

The set of Nachmann whisky beakers;

dd.

The Rosenthal crystal;

ee.

Copper pots and pans;

ff.

Pewterware;

gg.

Table linens to include one of the Army-Navy

hh.

Desk in the laundry room;

ii.

The old green table from "Pops;"

tableclothes;

jj.
One cardtable with one round piece of glass
and one rectangular piece;
kk.

The Flokoti rugs and brass samovar;

11.
The National Geographic books and magazines
and the bookcase in the study;
mm.

Handtools and power tools;

nn.

The aquarium;

oo.
All of
items, including uniforms;

Defendant's

personal

clothing

and

pp.
All items purchased by Defendant before marriage to include textbooks and records;
-5-
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qq.

Remainder of the flatware set;

rr.

Balance of Defendant's business records.

ss*

Large china hutch obtained from P. D. 0. in

Germany;
15.

16.

The plaintiff is specifically awarded
a.

The Gieol painting;

b.

Two Bassett paintings;

c.

The four-channel tape drive;

d.

Two bookcase speakers (Pioneer);

e.

SANSUI tuner;

f.

Grundig console and six speakers;

g.

AKAI tape deck (larger);

ho

Cassette deck;

ic

One of the three wall clocks;

jo

Pewter candlesticks;

k.

French hutch;

1.

Twelve Hummel figurines; and

m.

One set of tools for use around the house/.

^ „

«
^ ^

The defendant shall make available to the plain-

tiff any records that the plaintiff shall request so that they
can be reproduced on a cassette,**'.
J

ff^Z

^ ^

" >%*yr^

^ ^

>

^

;

17, Each of the parties is awarded all items of per-

sonal property in his/her possession not hereinabove specified.
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18.
plaintiff

The defendant is ordered to make available to the

any pictures, photographs or slides which she wishes

duplicated and those will be duplicated at her expense.
19.

The plaintiff

is awarded all of the accounts of

the children established with funds from the plaintifffs inheritance and the right and obligation to manage those accounts, and
the defendant is ordered to take appropriate steps to turn those
over to the plaintiff.
20.

All

right,

title

and

interest

in

the

home

on

Wasatch Drive is awarded to the plaintiff, free of any interest
of the defendant, subject to her payment of the first mortgage
and payment of the debt and obligation of approximately $4,000.00
due to the Pentagon Credit Union and approximately $3,500.00 to
the Norwest Credit Union.
these

obligations

from

The plaintiff shall be responsible for

and

after

August

1,

1987, and

she

is

ordered to hold the defendant harmless therefrom.
21.

The

Trinidad

note

is awarded

to

the

defendant,

free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff.
22.

Each of the parties is awarded one of the Horizon

lots which have no present value.
23.

The defendant is awarded the interest of the par-

ties in the United funds IRA account, the Fidelity Destiny Fund,
the Wilson-Davis Account; the Army Mutual Aid Insurance Policy,
the Air Defense Center Savings account, the Air Defense Center
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checking account, his Pentagon Credit Union account and his First
Security checking account.
24.

The

plaintiff

account, the Magellan

is

fund, the

awarded

the

Continental

family AT&T

IRA

stock, and her

accounts at the University of Utah Credit Union and plaintiff's
Pentagon Credit Union account.
25.

The defendant is awarded the 1980 Oldsmobile and

the plaintiff is awarded the 1982 Volvo and the 1986 Jetta.
26.

The/$32,384.00 earned by^tho dofondant through ^io

Baafl&gomen*4o£ the property inherited by the plaintiff is not considered an asset of the marriage.
27.

The defendant shall obtain from Sears a statement

of the account balance due as of May 1, 1986.
with having paid $140.00 on the account.

He is credited

Each of the parties

shall be obligated to pay one-half of the account balance as of
May 1, 1986.

If, after deduction of the $140.00 paid by the

defendant, there is a balance due of less than $140.00, it shall
be paid by the plaintiff.

If the amount due, after credit of the

$140.00 is more than $140.00, the defendant shall pay that sum to
the plaintiff

or judgment shall be entered

one-half of the balance over $280.00.

in her favor for

If the defendant, by pay-

ing $140.00 shall have paid more than one-half of the amount that
was due on May 1, 1986, the amount by which he has exceeded payment of one-half of the balance due shall be a credit against the
child support he shall have been ordered to pay.
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28.
that

bills

The court

for

heard

psychological

testimony

about

counseling

and

the

possibility

orthodontic

care

remain unpaid, but evidence was not presented as to amounts which
were sufficient for the court to make a firm determination.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, if there are orthodontic bills due which have not been paid by insurance, each of the
parties shall pay one-half of that unpaid balance and one-half of
any counseling bills incurred for and on behalf of the children.
If there is a bill for counseling for the defendant, he shall pay
it himself.
29.
due

The defendant

to MasterCharge

and

is ordered

First

to pay the obligations

Security

Bank

and

to hold

the

plaintiff harmless therefrom.
30.

Each of the parties shall assume, pay and hold the

other harmless from any debts or obligations incurred since their
separation.
31.

Each of the parties shall assume and pay their own

costs and fees as incurred in this matter.
32.

The request of the plaintiff that her fees be paid

by the defendant is denied, as she has substantial resources of
her own to pay her own fees.
33.

The

court

determined

regarding temporary support.

that

there

was

a

dispute

The defendant is ordered to verify

that all of the checks he testified he has transmitted

to the

plaintiff shall have cleared the bank and been paid to her.
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If

he determines that they have not cleared the bank, then, he is
ordered

to

put

stop

orders

against

those

checks

and

write

replacement checks,
34.

Each of the parties

is enjoined and prohibited

from physically abusing, harassing, bothering, or attempting to
intimidate the other in any way, wherever they may be or reside,
35.

The court, recognizing that the plaintiff claims

that the military retirement pay of the defendant is an asset
which should be divided which is disputed by the defendant who
contends that the fund is an income stream, not an asset because
it is being paid to him, and that the court has determined that

n

the defendant receives $1,484.00 as retirement payI upon which the
court has set the child support obligation of the defendant in
light of that obligation as well as the fact that the plaintiff
has accrued a retirement account through the State of Utah which
has a present value of $5,129.00 rules final disposition as to an
award regarding either of the retirement accounts of the parties
is reserved until the obligation to pay child support terminates.
36.

The court declares that it ^ believes that it has

divided the property of the parties withj[$87,7u7.00 being awarded
to the plaintiff andjf $99,913.00 being awarded to the defendant^
and the extra amount has been awarded to the defendant for financial services provided to the plaintiff and the marital estate.
37.

The court has determined that it should award to

the plaintiff the funds that she has inherited without counting
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that as part of the marital estate, although the defendant has
requested

that this be

included

for consideration purposes and

that part of it, that is, the money that has been earned from the
inheritancelthrough the management of the defendant be considered
as a marital asset.
DATED this

-£f

l°l

day of

41 SHiA^U^K^-, 1987.

KEtfNEfrH RIGTRUP
District Court Judge

H DIXON HIN2LEY
CLERK
By -J2*
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of
Divorce to the following on this //£ ^ day of September, 1987:
Ms. Barbara Van Asdlan
1516 South Wasatch Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah
DAVID S.
DSD:080487L
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